RR Phantom
Location : Wasted Space
Job/hobbies : Cayman Islands Actuary
 |  Subject: The Question of Anarchy or Limited Government  Wed Oct 12, 2016 11:22 pm | |
| In my last post I explained the goals of the Radical Capitalist: limited government and the banning of the initiation of force in society. There is only one set of ideas, in my opinion, that presents any type of challenge to the idea of limited government: the ideas of the anarchists.
Since socialist ideas have been shown to be completely vacuous, and with the more consistently socialist countries being such obvious failures, I believe the time has come to take some of the anarchist ideas a little more seriously, since a portion of these ideas, those espoused by some of the more thoughtful anarchists, represent the only challenge, limited as they may be, to Objectivism.
Even though I disagree with them, I believe that there are certain anarchists that have shown a high degree of integrity, hold their beliefs honestly and sincerely, and have at times made an eloquent case for their beliefs, although eloquence can be easy if we fully consider all the worst types of governments that have existed and that continue to exist in oppressing the best of mankind.
After all, it would not be a difficult choice for me, if I were compelled to choose between having to live under the government of North Korea or to endure no government at all, to take my chances with the latter.
The opportunity to contrast and compare, to weigh the implications of anarchist ideas, provides us a new way to understand the implications of Objectivist ideas without falling into dogmatism, because the truth is best discovered by not relying on dogmatic phrases, but by thinking through the implications of ideas, by continuously striving to rediscover the truth, even if the same conclusion is rediscovered again and again.
It seems that there are some anarchists who support Objectivist metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and esthetics, but are unhappy with the entire branch of philosophy that we know as politics. With this proximity, the confident Objectivist may have the opportunity to dissuade the undecided from prematurely embracing anarchy until some of the questions I am about to pose are satisfactorily answered.
As I am able to understand them (and hopefully not engage in misrepresentation), I intend to think through and chew over, from an economic perspective, some of what I consider to be the key anarchist ideas, to wit: (1) anarchy is the best way for humans to live with one another, (2) limited government is immoral because it violates rights, (3) limited government is impossible to achieve, and (4) even if limited government is possible, it is doomed to decline and fail.
Other than Objectivism and some of my own original thoughts, I intend to rely on some of the insights provided by Robert Nozick, in his book: Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Unlike Nozick’s book I do not have some 350 pages to chew things over, so my chewing will be a summary of some of the key ideas.
Also, I have to assume that the reader will have some familiarity some of the ideas of anarchy and Objectivism, but I will first strive to define a few terms in connection with both:
- Quote :
- Government: the institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct within a given geographic area (note: this Ayn Rand’s definition).
Protective Association/Agency: an agency that does not hold exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct within a given geographic area, but tries to protect its subscribers and negotiate with other agencies (also called a competing government).
Final Arbiter: For all practical purposes, the government.
Competing Governments: This is the idea that more than one government can exist within a given geographic area. Like a consumer selecting the best box of soap, subscribers/consumers can select the government that best suits their needs. This is not to be confused with federalism, where levels of government with essentially non-concurrent responsibilities exist within the same geographic area and where the levels of responsibility exist under a charter or constitution.
To begin:
Is anarchy the best form of human interaction? In order to try to answer that question I first need to answer another question: is anarchy even possible? The answer to this question should be: yes, it is possible and it has been a form of human interaction throughout history.
If we imagine three men shipwrecked on an island, with one specializing in hunting and fishing, the second specializing in farming and gathering, and the third engaged in building huts and doing housekeeping and cooking, we can imagine a limited division-of-labor society where everyone benefits by mutual co-operation.
A formal government is not needed, and, if it were to somehow exist, it would most likely be an unnecessary complication and a positive hindrance to their mutual co-operation. It is interesting to note what is not needed by the men of this mini society, such as deeded property, posterity, or any consideration of permanence beyond their immediate lifetimes.
But even if we were to expand the island group with the addition of three women (and the potential for children), the idea of needing to impose a government would seem ludicrous, even if there were now considerations made for potential posterity.
Historically there have been nomadic groups and settled communities that have had no discernable form of government. However, if we are to fully take into account the way of anarchy as a form of human interaction, there seems to be a significant contextual problem.
By all appearances anarchy has existed only under the following conditions: low population, relative isolation, and relatively low division of labor. There seems to be a type of critical mass among these three conditions. Raise the population, then somehow the division of labor increases and a final arbiter appears on the scene (i.e., government). Or, a decrease in isolation will induce the other two conditions to arise and the final arbiter shows up again.
It is also important to distinguish between what I would term as “pure” anarchy vs. “apparent” anarchy, such as, for example, a collection of mini states where a “final arbiter” is present within each state. Another example would be a community that makes an anarchic claim, but is really dependent on the surrounding state.
Let us now speculate on what happens: from an original state of pure anarchy, as relative isolation begins to decrease, small groups then form their own protective associations. These associations are successful for a while, but as isolation continues to decrease, the protective associations come in conflict with one another as each association tries to defend its subscribers against the other association.
Some associations are more successful (or lucky?) than the others. One association begins to dominate a particular geographic area. The subscribers to the weaker associations begin to wonder if it would be in their best interest change their subscriptions, or at least consider moving closer to the center of where their current association offers better prospects for protection.
Also, the associations begin to experience internal problems. Perhaps each member of the association is required to come to defense of another member whenever an alarm is sounded. However, some members are taking advantage of their membership by “crying wolf” more than the others.
The more astute members of the weaker associations begin to find ways to try to exploit any advantages they might have in terms of geography. Perhaps a particular weaker association holds the high ground with the only reliable water source. War could develop between the weaker and the dominant association, but it could be very costly for both. Some of the other weaker associations begin to engage in acts of piracy.
But also now the dominant association is experiencing growing pains. As more people subscribe to it because of its perceived success, the association experiences increasing pressure to satisfy demands for resources, like reliable water from the weaker association described above.
The dominant association has another problem (among many others too numerous to describe here). As the dominant association (with the most subscribers) it may also tend to have higher production from its relatively high division of labor, but it may be experiencing trading difficulties with other subscribers due to its relative disadvantage in centralized population concentration; it has to move trade goods through insecure territories.
The conflicts between (and within) the protective associations prove unsatisfactory and the associations begin to mutually agree to work toward seeking out an arbiter. Eventually, perhaps after many negotiations and renegotiations, a final arbiter is chosen to provide the formal stability desired (i.e., a government).
Something remarkable has now happened. We have imagined a process that is a close analogy with the rise of gold as the premier medium of exchange. Just as gold has come to satisfy mankind’s objective need for a reliable medium of exchange, government has come to satisfy mankind’s objective need to protect and secure the goods being exchanged under the required conditions.
After Adam Smith, this is what Nozick refers to as an invisible-hand explanation. An invisible-hand explanation explains what looks to be the product of someone’s intentional design, as not being brought about by anyone’s intentions. In the case above, we can imagine how people, pursuing their own self-interest, wind up creating a complex institution (i.e., a government) without ever planning it.
It also blows apart the Lockean theory of the social contract. Just as no express agreement and no social contract fixing a medium of exchange is necessary, neither is one needed to explain the rise of government.
The invisible-hand explanation would appear to represent a significant challenge to the contention that governments must inevitably arise as tyrannies. Even if a Gengis Khan type of conqueror were to impose a government on a supposedly peaceful anarchic (i.e., pre-governmental) geographic area, the invisible-hand explanation posits that, under the required conditions a government would have arisen anyway.
If governments could originally arise to enhance individual self-interest by lubricating and facilitating trade, then it must also be admitted that governments also have the tendency to lose sight of their original purpose. If governments can arise unconsciously, and from a properly moral impulse, then it would not be difficult to imagine as well that governments can degenerate whenever men are not fully conscious.
But consciousness is also an acquired trait. It became so with the birth of philosophy. Prior to the twentieth century, the last great highlight of consciousness came in the form of practical philosophy made by men who invented the Constitution of the United States. Before the great advances in economics given to us by Ludwig von Mises, the Constitution laid the groundwork for capitalism and the division-of-labor society.
Today, the car I drive and the house I live in are the end results of a massive division of labor from large populations with access to trade routes. My home air conditioner alone is the product of an assembly line of multiple assembly lines, such as the lines producing the wires, the switches, the coils, the smelting of the metals, the molding of the plastics, and so on.
And each one of the goods in these various lines of production has to have an assurance of protection from the first unit produced and shipped to the final payment for it in a long line of protected of transactions and contracts.
Under a government the cost of protection, over and above any private insurance contracts that provide compensation for lost, stolen or damaged goods, would be the taxes and regulations required from the productive enterprise. However, any private insurer will offer protection only if it believes that there will be a slim possibility that it will ever have to pay out. Thus the private insurer will have the desire to contract for protection as well.
Leaving aside any specific costs charged for each level of protection, in order for a productive enterprise to transport goods across the continental United States, we may have to consider the federal, state and local governments, plus private insurance, if any. Thus we have four protection agencies (3 government plus one private).
Now let us imagine trying to impose a system of competing protective associations on a high division of labor system where goods need to be transported (and paid for) over distances of thousands of miles. While in the United States today the producer has to function under a federal system (and foreign governments as well if the goods are exported), under a system of protective associations the potential for the producer will be to contract with potentially unlimited numbers of protective associations.
Not only will the producer have to consider contracting with the dominant protective association within a particular geographic area, but will have to consider the cost of not contracting with the less dominant ones. If we again consider transporting goods across what is now the continental U.S., an approximate distance of 3000 miles, then the producer is faced with a minimum of 60 protective associations with an average span of 50 miles.
But a span of 50 miles is a lot of territory (with 50 X 50 the equivalent of 2500 square miles). Would not any dominant protective association powerful enough to cover a territory of that size begin to take on the appearance of a government? If we reduce the average span of the protective associations to 15 miles, then the producer is potentially contracting with 200 associations!
This is not the end of the potential problem. In some territories, there is no clearly dominant protective association. In a territory with two roughly equal agencies, it might be wise to contract with both. Of course there is also the consideration not paying and using armed guards or having a willingness to pay ransom.
I cannot begin to exhaust all the possibilities. The real point of the preceding paragraphs is that anarchy appears to be very expensive.
Conclusion:
If the branch of Objectivist philosophy known as politics is to be discarded, the anarchist may not feel the need to make an affirmative case for anarchy, but the Objectivist concept of politics will not be overturned without a clear answer to the following questions:
- Quote :
- Is anarchy expensive? If not, how so?
Or to put (1) another way, how are the costs associated with a final arbiter more expensive than competing governments?
If anarchy is conceded to be more expensive, how are the benefits in terms of human happiness greater than the economic losses?
Can a high division-of-labor society exist under anarchy?
Why is Nozick’s invisible-hand explanation not possible?
http://radcap.org/?p=1134 |
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