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 Location : Ether-Sphere
Job/hobbies : Irrationality Exterminator
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 |  Subject: Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit  Wed Jun 30, 2010 3:45 am | |
| Abstract: The claim that all legitimate defense functions can and must be privately supplied flies in the face of certain economic doctrines that are almost universally accepted. Almost all economists declare that national defense is a “public good” that will be provided in sub-optimal quantities—or not provided at all—by private, profit-seeking firms. The purpose of this paper is to challenge just that sort of statement. The attack on national defense as a public good which must be provided by the state will be two-pronged.
One part, the briefer of the two, will raise theoretical questions about public goods in general and national defense in particular. The second part will be devoted to a detailed survey of privateering, a form of naval warfare conducted by privately-owned ships which lasted from the twelfth century to the nineteenth century. What privateers were, how they operated, the legal customs that grew up around them, how effective they were, how profitable they were, and why they disappeared will all be addressed. The common employment of privateers during wartime will be offered as empirical evidence that defense need not be monopolized by the state.
http://www.independent.org/publications/working_papers/article.asp?id=752
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Privatized security is not just a theoretical concept, but has a long history in the West. In the early Middle Ages, a citizen of one territory was able to get a permit to achieve restitution against a foreigner (more exactly, his country) who had victimized him. The aggrieved would arm a ship and set off to find a merchant vessel flying the flag of the country of the offender. He then impounded and auctioned off the cargo. These “privateers,” as they came to be called, became common throughout the Mediterranean. As shown by Larry Sechrest in "Privateering and National Defense," the practice evolved and by the 19th-century, governments were issuing permits only for private citizens to seize enemy merchant ships during times of war. As in all other cases, the market proved to be superior to the state. According to one historian, “without the presence of the American privateers in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the United States would never have been able to hold off the British Navy” and another concludes that between 1600 and 1815, privateers “probably contributed much more than warships” to inflicting losses on enemies. Private maritime forces were banned in the 1856 Declaration of Paris under pressure from career naval officers and in the interests of larger states wishing to prevent smaller rivals from using a cost-effective option to challenge their dominance in the world’s oceans.
Guerilla wars are another kind of privatized defense, even if the insurgents occasionally receive support from governments. Just since the end of World War II, we’ve seen time and time again primitive forces challenge and often even defeat the armies of powerful states: the Chechens against the Russians, Algerians against the French, Vietnamese against the French, Vietnamese against the Americans, Afghanis against the Russians, Afghanis against the Americans, Iraqis against the Americans, Kurds against the Turks, Kurds against the Iraqis, Kurd against the Iranians, Chinese communists against the Nationalists, Cuban communists against the Batista regime, Lebanese against the Israelis, Irish against the British, Palestinians against the Israelis, and the communists in Greece, among other movements. The guerillas enjoy all the advantages that privately funded and staffed enterprises have over states such as the ability to adjust quickly, greater incentives for satisfactory performance, a superior workforce and a more meritocratic promotion system.
http://www.alternativeright.com/main/blogs/exit-strategies/ayn-rand-s-curious-bloodlust/ |
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